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ABSTRACT: The benefit of Structural Health Monitoring (SHM) can be properly quantified using the 
concept of Value of Information (VoI), i.e. the difference between the utilities of operating the structure 
with and without the monitoring system. In calculating the VoI, a commonly understood assumption is 
that all decisions concerning system installation and operation are taken by the same rational agent. In 
the real world, the individual who decides on buying a monitoring system, the owner, is often not the 
same individual, the manager, who will use it, and they may behave differently because of their different 
risk aversion. We demonstrate that in a decision-making process where the two individuals involved 
share exactly the same information, but behave differently, the VoI can be negative. Indeed, even if the 
two agents have an agreement a priori, due to their different behaviors, their optimal actions can diverge 
after the installation of the monitoring system. This scenario could generate a negative Vol from the 
owner’s perspective. In this work, we propose a qualitative and quantitative formulation to evaluate when 
and under which circumstances the VoI can be negative, if the owner differs from the manager with 
respect to their risk prioritization. Moreover, we apply this formulation on a real-life case study 
concerning the Streicker Bridge (Princeton, NJ). The results demonstrate that when the owner, because 
of the manager’s different behaviour, is forced to undertake an action he would not chose, his VoI 
becomes negative, i.e. it is not convenient for him to install the monitoring system. This framework aims 
to help the owner in quantifying the money saved by entrusting the evaluation of the state of the structure 
to the monitoring system, even if the manager’s behavior toward risk is different from the owner’s own, 
and so are his management decisions.
1. INTRODUCTION 
Structural Health Monitoring (SHM) is a 
powerful tool for bridge management. However, 
seen from a mere structural engineering 
perspective, its utility may not be immediately 
evident. Wear for a minute the hat of the manager 
of a Department of Transportation (DoT), 
responsible for the safety of a bridge: would you 
invest your limited budget on a reinforcing work 
or on a monitoring system? Monitoring does not 
provide structural capacity, rather better 
information on the state of a structure; based on 
this information, the manager can make better 
decisions on the management of the structure, 
minimizing the chances of wrong choices, and 
eventually increasing the safety of the bridge over 
its lifespan. The benefit of information is formally 
quantified by the so-called Value of Information 
(VoI), a concept anything but new: it was first 
introduced by Lindley (Lindley, 1956) in 1956, as 
a measure of the information provided by an 
experiment, and later formalized by Raiffa and 
Schlaifer (Raiffa & Schlaifer, 1961) and DeGroot 
(DeGroot, 1984). Implicitly it was introduced in 
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the SHM community in the 1980s (Thoft-
Christensen & Sorensen, 1987), while explicitly it 
is much more recent and dates back, in our best 
knowledge, to a paper published in 2005 (Straub 
& Faber, 2005), followed by Bernal et al. (Bernal, 
et al., 2009), Pozzi et al. (Pozzi, et al., 2010), 
Thöns & Faber (Thons & Faber, 2013), Zonta et 
al. (Zonta, et al., 2014), - a recent state of the art 
can be found in Thöns (Thons, 2017). Based on 
the new developments, the value of a SHM system 
can be simply defined as the difference between 
the benefit, or expected utility u*, of operating the 
structure with the monitoring system and the 
benefit, or expect utility u, of operating the 
structure without the system. Both u* and u are 
expected utilities calculated a priori, i.e. before 
actually receiving any information from the 
monitoring system. 
In the classical literature of the VoI, the main 
assumption is that all decisions concerning system 
installation and operation are taken by the same 
rational agent. However, we must recognize that 
in the real world SHM-based decision processes 
are typically more complex, with more 
individuals involved in the decision chain 
(Bolognani, et al., 2018). Indeed, even 
oversimplifying, we always have at least two 
different decision stages. First a decision is made 
on whether or not to buy and install the 
monitoring system on the structure; this is a 
problem of long-term planning and investment of 
financial resources. This decision is typically 
carried out by a high-level manager, that in this 
paper we will conventionally refer to as owner, 
whose key performance measure is return on 
investment. The second stage concerns the day-to-
day operation of the structure which includes for 
example maintenance, repair, retrofit or enforcing 
traffic limitations, once the monitoring system is 
installed; if installed these decisions may be 
informed by the monitoring system. This decision 
is typically carried out by a regular engineer 
instead, which we will conventionally refer to as 
manager. Most of the time, the manager and the 
owner of the structure are different individuals. 
Decision makers will differ in their choices under 
uncertainty even when they have access to the 
same information if they have different appetites 
for risk. As such, the owner needs to consider the 
operator’s appetite for risk when deciding 
whether to install a monitoring system, as this will 
indicate how the system will inference the 
operator’s decision making and as such the value 
of this information. When calculating the VoI, 
assuming all decisions concerning system 
installation and operation taken by the same 
rational agent, it can only be positive, consistently 
with the principle that “information can’t hurt”, as 
reported in Pozzi (Pozzi, et al., 2017). On the 
other hand, in a decision-making process where 
the two individuals involved share exactly the 
same information, but behave differently, the VoI 
can be negative: we can always find a 
combination of prior probabilities and utility 
functions which ultimately yields a negative 
conditional VoI. Indeed, even if the two agents 
have an agreement a priori, due to their different 
behaviors, their optimal actions can diverge after 
the installation of the monitoring system. 
2. FORMULATION OF THE VOI 
In this chapter, we review the concepts of the VoI, 
presented in detail in  (Bolognani, et al., 2018). In 
the classical formulation, which we will refer as 
unconditional, i.e. assuming all decisions 
concerning system installation and operation 
taken by the same rational agent, the VoI of a 
monitoring system is simply the difference 
between the expected utility with the monitoring 
system u* and the corresponding utility without 
the monitoring system u: 
VoI = u* −  u . (1) 
Let’s investigate the meaning of each member. In 
the case of a structure not equipped with a 
monitoring system, the rational manager decides 
without accessing any SHM data, and he will 
choose the action a that maximize the expected 
utility u. So, the utility without monitoring, also 
called prior utility, is calculated as follows: 
u = max
j
u(aj) . (2) 
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In contrast, if a monitoring system is installed and 
the data are available for the agent, the monitoring 
observation y affects the state knowledge, and 
therefore indirectly their decisions. In this case, 
the expected utility u*, also called pre-posterior 
utility, can be derived from the posterior expected 
utility u(y) by marginalizing out the variable y: 
u* = E𝐲 [max
j
u(aj,y)] =
= ∫ max
j
u(aj,y) ∙ p(y) 
Dy
dy. (3)
 
In conclusion, the unconditional VoI of a 
monitoring system is: 
VoI = u* −  u =
= ∫ max
j
u(aj,y) ∙ p(y) 
Dy
dy − max
j
u(aj) . (4)
 
It is easily mathematically verified that u* is 
always greater or equal than u, and therefore the 
VoI as formulated above can only be positive. 
This is to say that under the assumption above 
SHM is always useful, consistently with the 
principle that “information can’t hurt” (Cover & 
Thomas, 2012).  
We propose now, a new formulation for the 
quantification of the VoI, which we will refer as 
conditional, for the specific case of two separate 
individuals involved in the decision chain 
(Bolognani, et al., 2018). We use the indices (M) 
and (O) to indicate that a quantity is intended 
respectively from the manager’s and owner’s 
perspective. Therefore, all utilities are from the 
owner perspective, but should be evaluated 
accounting for the action that the manager, not the 
owner, is expected to choose. In other words, the 
utility of the owner is conditional to the action 
chosen by the manager. Consequently, the 
expected utility without the monitoring system 
becomes: 
u
(O|M)  = u(O) ( a(M)
opt
) =
= u
(O) {arg max
j
u(aj)
(M)
} . (5)
 
 
Similarly, the expected utility of the owner in the 
expectation of what the manager would decide if 
a monitoring system was installed turns into:  
 
 u* 
(O|M)
= ∫ u
(O) {arg max
j
u(aj,y)
(M)
} ∙ p(y) dy
Dy
. (6) 
 
Finally, the conditional VoI of a monitoring 
system can be calculated as follows: 
 VoI 
(O|M)
 = u*
(O|M)
−  u 
(O|M)
 = 
= ∫ u
(O) {arg max
j
u(aj,y)
(M)
} ∙ p(y) dy
Dy
−
− u
(O) {arg max
j
u(aj)
(M)
} . (7)
 
We note that in the conditional case there is no 
logical necessity whereby the manager pre-
posterior utility must be greater than her/his prior. 
So, in principle we can always find a combination 
of prior probabilities and utility functions which 
ultimately yield a negative conditional VoI. We 
illustrate this concept with a real-life case study in 
the next chapter. 
3. THE STREICKER BRIDGE CASE STUDY 
The Streicker bridge, presented in Fig. 1, is a 
pedestrian steel-concrete structure located at 
Princeton University Campus, which was 
equipped with a continuous monitoring system by 
the SHM-lab of the University. The bridge and its 
monitoring system are illustrated in much detail in 
a number of publications (Glisic & Adriaenssens, 
2010) (Glisic & Inaudi, 2012). The SHM-based 
decision problem, the assumptions and the 
individuals involved, are the same as in  
(Bolognani, et al., 2018). The bridge is managed 
by two fictitious agents with distinct roles: 
Ophelia (O) the owner responsible for Princeton’s 
estate, who decides on whether or not to install the 
monitoring system; Malcom (M) the manager 
responsible for the bridge operation and 
maintenance, who has to take decisions on the 
state of the bridge based on monitoring data. They 
are both rational individuals with the same 
knowledge background, they only differ in the 
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way how to weight the seriousness of the 
consequences of a failure. They are concerned by 
a single specific scenario: a truck, driving along 
Washington road, could collide with the steel arch 
of the bridge. After the incident, the bridge will be 
in one of the following two states: No Damage 
(U), i.e. the structure has either no damage or 
some minor damage; Damage (D), i.e. the bridge 
is still standing but has suffered major damage. 
According to them, the two states are mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive: P(D)+P(U)=1. Based 
on their experience, they both agree that scenario 
U and D have the same probability to occur, i.e. 
P(D)=50% and P(U)=50% as prior probabilities.  
 
Figure 1: View of the Streicker bridge (a) and location 
of sensors in the main span (b). 
They also use the same interpretation model, i.e. 
they interpret identically the data from the 
monitoring system. After Malcolm estimates the 
state of the bridge, he may decide between two 
actions: Do nothing (DN), i.e. no special 
restrictions to traffic under and over the bridge; 
Close Bridge (CB), i.e. both Streicker Bridge and 
Washington Road are closed to traffic for the time 
needed for a thorough inspection, estimated to be 
1 month. Finally, they agree that the costs z 
related to each action, for each scenario, are the 
ones estimated in (Glisic & Adriaenssens, 2010) 
and reported in Table 1. 
Table 1: Costs per action and state. 
 Scenario U Scenario D 
Action DN  z=0,0 k$ zF=881,6 k$ 
Action CB zDT=139,8 k$ zDT=139,8 k$ 
However, they differ in their utility functions, i.e.  
the weight they apply to the possible economic 
losses. Ophelia the owner is risk neutral, meaning 
that according to her a negative utility is linear 
with the incurred loss. Conversely, the behaviour 
of Malcolm can be risk adverse, i.e. his negative 
utility increases more than proportionally with the 
loss, or risk seeking, i.e. his negative utility 
increases less than proportionally with the loss. It 
is possible to describe mathematically these 
behaviours using the Arrow-Pratt’s utility model 
(Arrow, 1965) , where the different aptitude of an 
agent is encoded in the coefficient of Absolute 
Risk Aversion (ARA) θ. Fig. 2 shows the linear 
utility function of Ophelia and both Malcom’s 
behaviours: θ = -1.423 M$-1 if we model him as 
risk adverse, θ = 5.234 M$-1 if he is risk seeking.  
 
Figure 2: Representation of the utility functions. 
3.1. Risk adverse 
In this first case we consider Ophelia’s utility 
function linear, i.e. risk neutral, while Malcolm’s 
one concave, according to his risk adverse 
behavior. Table 2 shows their consequent utilities. 
Table 2: Ophelia’s and Malcolm’s loss perception. 
Ophelia the owner RISK NEUTRAL 
 Scenario U Scenario D 
DN  𝑈(𝑧)
(𝑂)
=0,0 k$ 𝑈(𝑧𝐹)
(𝑂)
=-881,6 k$ 
CB 𝑈(𝑧𝐷𝑇)
(𝑂)
=-139,8 k$ 𝑈(𝑧𝐷𝑇)
(𝑂)
=-139,8 k$ 
Malcolm the manager RISK ADVERSE 
 Scenario U Scenario D 
DN  𝑈(𝑧)
(𝑀)
=0,0 k$ 𝑈(𝑧𝐹)
(𝑀)
=-1762,9k$ 
CB 𝑈(𝑧𝐷𝑇)
(𝑀)
=-154,9 k$ 𝑈(𝑧𝐷𝑇)
(𝑀)
=-154,9k$ 
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Before the monitoring system is installed, if we 
consider Ophelia alone, she would always choose 
to close the bridge when her utility related to the 
action CB is less negative than the utility of action 
DN, or rather: 
𝑢CB
(O)
≥ 𝑢DN
(O)
, (8) 
𝑈(𝑧𝐷𝑇)
(O) ≥ 𝑈(𝑧F)
(O) ∙ P(D). (9) 
According to Eq. (8) and Eq. (9), we can obtain 
Ophelia’s and Malcom’s prior probability 
thresholds, (O)r and (M)r respectively, which give 
us the probability value of damage after which is 
always more convenient for them to close the 
bridge a priori: 
P(D) ≥
𝑈(𝑧𝐷𝑇)
(O)
𝑈(𝑧F)
(O)
= 𝑟
(O) = 0.16. (10) 
P(D) ≥
𝑈(𝑧𝐷𝑇)
(M)
𝑈(𝑧F)
(M)
= 𝑟
(M) = 0.09. (11) 
Both prior thresholds are illustrated in Fig. 3; 
Malcolm’s one is clearly lower because of his risk 
adverse behavior. Moreover, we can observe that 
if we assume, as explain previously, P(D)=50% 
and P(U)=50% as prior probabilities, they both 
agree on closing the bridge as the best choice a 
priori. 
Consider now the monitoring system 
installed. Ophelia’s and Malcolm’s pre-posterior 
expected utilities of doing nothing, respectively 
(O)u*DN(ε) and (M)u*DN(ε), depend on the posterior 
probability of having the bridge damaged p(D|ε), 
which in turn depends on the monitoring 
observations ε, as reported in (Bolognani, et al., 
2018). As rational agents, Ophelia and Malcolm 
will always take the decision related to the 
minimum loss. According to Eq. (4) and Eq. (7), 
we can calculate the VoI of Ophelia alone and her 
conditional VoI, i.e. if we consider Ophelia 
conditioned to Malcolm’s choices, respectively. 
The black lines in Fig. 4(a), 𝑢DN 
(O)
and 𝑢CB 
(O)
, 
are Ophelia’s prior utilities related to the action 
DN and CB respectively. The red curve, 𝑢∗ 
(O)
,  is 
her pre-posterior utility while the red dashed one, 
𝑢∗ 
(O|M)
, her conditional pre-posterior utility, i.e. 
conditioned to Malcolm’s choices. Fig. 4(b) 
shows the unconditional and the conditional VoI 
(dashed curve) of Ophelia instead; all quantities 
are plotted in function of the probability of 
damage P(D). We can observe that both Ophelia’s 
unconditional and conditional VoI are maximum 
at her prior threshold (O)r, because the prior 
utilities takes over the posterior utilities and are 
responsible for the cusp in the graph of the VoI. 
However, even if the conditional VoI of Ophelia 
decreases compared to the unconditional one, we 
cannot find any value of P(D) for which it 
becomes negative. This happens because, due to 
Malcolm’s risk adverse behavior, he would 
always choose to close the bridge sooner than 
Ophelia. We can analyze better this situation 
plotting the posterior utilities of the two rational 
agents in function of the monitoring observations 
𝛆 (Fig. 5). Due to their different behaviors, they 
perceive the risk differently and consequently 
they have two different strain thresholds. In 
particular, as shown in Fig. 5, we can demonstrate 
that even if they share exactly the same prior 
information, Malcolm, because of his risk adverse 
behavior, would always choose to close the bridge 
sooner than Ophelia ((M)  ε̅u  = -111 με < 
(O) ε̅u  = 
126με). We remind that the unconditional VoI of 
Ophelia, according to Eq. (4), is equal to the area 
between the posterior utility 𝑢DN(y) 
(O)
and the 
horizontal line related to the action closing the 
bridge 𝑢CB(y) 
(O)
; it corresponds to the blue area 
plus the dashed one, in Fig. 5. On the other hand, 
the conditional VoI, according to Eq. (7), is equal 
to the area between the conditional posterior 
utility 𝑢(y) 
(O|M)
 and 𝑢CB(y) 
(O)
; it corresponds to 
the blue area. We can observe that, if Malcolm is 
risk adverse and he chooses to CB sooner than 
Ophelia, the conditional VoI is smaller than the 
unconditional, but it can never become negative. 
3.2. Risk seeking 
We consider Ophelia still risk neutral, but now 
Malcolm is risk seeking instead. This is to say that 
his utility function is convex (i.e. with positive 
second derivative), as shown in Fig. 2. We can 
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again assume an Arrow-Pratt’s utility model, but 
this time with a positive ARA coefficient θ = 
5.234 M$-1. By considering Ophelia still risk 
neutral, as from Table 2, the costs related to each 
action remain the same, while new Malcolm’s 
utilities are reported in Table 3. 
Table 3: Malcolm’s loss perception. 
Malcolm the manager RISK SEEKING 
 Scenario U Scenario D 
DN  𝑈(𝑧)
(𝑀)
=0,00 k$ 𝑈(𝑧𝐹)
(𝑀)
=-103,9 k$ 
CB 𝑈(𝑧𝐷𝑇)
(𝑀)
=-99,2 k$ 𝑈(𝑧𝐷𝑇)
(𝑀)
=-99,2 k$ 
Ophelia’s prior threshold does not vary respect to 
Eq. (10), (O)r = 0.16, while Malcolm’s risk seeking 
priori threshold, according to Eq. (9), turns into 
(M)r = 0.53. This is clearly higher than his risk 
adverse prior threshold (M)r = 0.09, and also higher 
than Ophelia’s one because of his risk seeking 
behavior: his negative utility increases less than 
proportionally with the loss. The utility functions 
a priori with the thresholds are shown in Fig. 6.  
Consider now the monitoring system 
installed and all the assumptions about the VoI 
made previously. Fig. 7(a) shows Ophelia prior 
and pre-posterior utilities, while Fig. 7(b) her 
conditional and unconditional VoI. Again, we can 
observe that both of these quantities are maximum 
at Ophelia prior threshold, (O)r = 0.16, and as they 
reach the top of the curve, they tend to decrease. 
Again, the prior utilities of Ophelia related to the 
action CB and DN are responsible for the cusps of 
the graph. However, in contrast to the previous 
case, now the conditional VoI of Ophelia (dashed 
line), not only decreases compared to the 
unconditional one (solid line), but we can also 
find a range of P(D) where it becomes negative.  
In detail, by modelling Malcolm as risk 
seeking, we can always find a specific value of the 
damage probability (O|M)P(D)lim after which the 
conditional VoI of Ophelia is negative or equal to 
zero. By analyzing it from a mathematical point 
of view, we can obtain (O|M)P(D)lim from: 
𝑉𝑜𝐼 
(O|M)
=  𝑢
(O|M) ∗ − 𝑢
(O|M)
 ≤ 0, (12) 
which, solved in terms of P(D), provides us the 
following inequality: 
P(D) ≤
F𝜀|U( 𝜀̅
(M) )
𝑟−1
(O) ∙ F𝜀|D( 𝜀(̅PDM,𝑗)
(M) ) − F𝜀|D( 𝜀̅
(M) ) + F𝜀|U( 𝜀̅
(M) )
, (13) 
where, Fε|D(
(M)𝜀 )̅ and Fε|U((M)𝜀 )̅ are the cumulate 
distributions for the damage and undamaged 
scenario respectively, while (O)r is Ophelia’s prior 
threshold. In Eq. (13), when P(D) starts to be 
greater than the member on the right side, the 
conditional VoI of Ophelia becomes negative. We 
identify this threshold as (O|M)P(D)lim, which in this 
specific case is equal to 0.48. This means that, if 
we model Malcolm the manager as risk seeking, 
and we assume a priori a damage probability 
higher than (O|M)P(D)lim=0.48, we are pretty sure to 
find a negative values of the conditional VoI. 
Moreover, if we plot Ophelia’s and Malcolm’s 
posterior utilities, in function of the monitoring 
observations, we find again two different strain 
thresholds. In detail, as shown in Fig. 8, Malcolm, 
would choose to close the bridge later than 
Ophelia ((M)  ε̅u =464 με  > 
(O)  ε̅u =126 με ). 
Ophelia’s threshold has remained obviously the 
same, while Malcolm’s one is increased because 
of his risk seeking behavior. So, there is a very 
wide range of values, from 126 to 464 με , 
whereby Malcolm would keep the bridge open in 
disagreement with Ophelia, who believes this is a 
dangerous practice which can potentially result is 
a big loss. Indeed, from Fig. 8 we can observe that 
after her threshold, Ophelia is forced to proceed 
along her posterior curve related to the action DN, 
𝑢DN(y) 
(O)
, until Malcolm’s threshold, even if it 
would be more convenient for her to close the 
bridge. According to Fig. 8, the conditional VoI is 
equal to the blue area less the red one. Since we 
chose P(D)=50%, greater than (O|M)P(D)lim, the red 
is claerly bigger than the blue one, and 
consequently we obtain a negative conditional 
VoI, meaning that in this case Ophelia perceives 
the monitoring information as damaging. In this 
case, a negative VoI is exactly the amount of 
money Ophelia is willing to pay to prevent 
Malcolm using the monitoring system. 
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Figure 3: Representation of Ophelia’s and Malcom’s 
utility functions a priori (i.e. without monitoring). 
 
 
Figure 4: Representation of Ophelia’s and Malcom’s 
prior and preposterior utilities in function of P(D) (a); 
respective VoI (b). 
 
Figure 5: Representation of Ophelia’s and Malcom’s 
preposterior utilities u* in function of monitoring data. 
Figure 6: Representation of Ophelia’s and Malcom’s 
utility functions a priori (i.e. without monitoring). 
 
Figure 7: Representation of Ophelia’s and Malcom’s 
prior and preposterior utilities in function of P(D) (a); 
respective VoI (b). 
Figure 8: Representation of Ophelia’s and Malcom’s 
preposterior utilities u* in function of monitoring data. 
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
The benefit of SHM can be quantified using the 
concept of the Value of Information. In its 
calculation, a commonly understood assumption 
is that the individual who decide on the 
installation of the monitoring system, the owner, 
is the same rational agent who will later use it, the 
manager. With this assumption, the VoI is never 
negative, according to the assumption that 
“information can’t hurt”. On the other hand, it has 
been demonstrated that two different rational 
agents may be involved in the decision process. In 
this contribution, we demonstrate that under 
appropriate combination of prior information and 
utility functions, the conditional VoI, i.e. the VoI 
of the owner conditioned to the manager choices, 
could be negative. In general, this can happen 
when the owner perceives the monitoring 
information as damaging, and then he/she 
believes that the monitoring system can seriously 
mislead the decision of the manager. Regarding 
the specific real-life case study about the Streicker 
Bridge, it turned out that it is possible to obtain a 
negative conditional VoI if we model Malcolm 
with a risk seeking behavior. Indeed, even if the 
two rational agents a priori share exactly the same 
information and agree on their choices, Malcolm 
would choose a posteriori to close the bridge later 
than Ophelia, because of his behavior. For this 
reason, she is forced to leave the bridge against 
her will, even if it would be more convenient for 
her to close it. Ophelia believes this is a dangerous 
practice that can potentially result is a big loss; 
consequently, we find a wide range of the damage 
prior probability in which the VoI results negative. 
On the other hand, if we model Malcolm with a 
risk adverse behavior, the VoI is never negative. 
In conclusion, we want to highlight that a negative 
VoI is exactly the amount of money the owner is 
willing to pay to prevent the manager using the 
monitoring system. 
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